This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.
CHINA TRADE.
CONFIDENTIAL.
No. 1.
[July 13.]
SECTION 2.
Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 13.)
(No. 222. Confidential.) Sir,
Peking, May 23, 1908.
WITH reference to my despatch No. 158 of the 2nd April, I have honour to report that negotiations have been proceeding for some weeks past between the Swedish Minister, M. Wallenberg, and his Excellency Lien-fang, a Minister of the Wai-wu Pu, for the conclusion of a new Treaty between Sweden and China.
M. Wallenberg informs me that prior to coming to China he had prepared a draft Treaty, composed of Articles extracted from the recent Treaties concluded with China, more especially the Japanese Treaty of 1895, from which he had drawn largely. This document he submitted to the Chinese negotiator, who, after studying it for some time, signified his intention of presenting a counter-draft. The latter was forthcoming in due course, and in producing it read a sort of preface or preamble in which attention was drawn to the fact that the Swedish draft was based upon the Japanese Treaty of 1895, and it was explained that the concessions accorded to Japan by this instrument were the result of a successful war, and could not be extended to a Power of the standing occupied by Sweden.
M. Wallenberg took exception to this declaration, and after some discussion it was, I understand, withdrawn; but he has apparently been unable to induce the Chinese Government to accept his draft as a basis of negotiation.
Some days ago he consulted me with the view of ascertaining what prospect there was of his being able to enlist my own intervention and that of my colleagues, the Representatives of the other Powers, in bringing the Chinese to understand that they could not discriminate between the various foreign Powers, and that privileges enjoyed by one must be granted to all.
While agreeing with M. Wallenberg that smaller Powers should not be excluded from the benefits granted by Treaty to the larger ones, I said that I should not feel justified in intervening without express instructions from yourself, and that probably my colleagues would share the view that the initiative in such a question should proceed from their Governments rather than from themselves.
M. Wallenberg then asked my opinion as to the course which he should pursue, whether he should insist upon adhering to his own draft, or consent to enter into negotiations upon the basis of the Chinese draft, which contained many objectionable features.
Not having seen the latter, I could only say that my experience was that in dealing with Chinese there is little prospect of improving a situation if one starts on an unsatisfactory basis. Even if the alternative was, as M. Wallenberg expected, the abandonment of the question, it would probably be better to rest content with the old Treaty concluded with Sweden and Norway in 1847, with its most-favoured-nation clause, than to embark upon negotiations which gave little prospect of success, and which involved the sacrifice of essential principles.
I have, &c.
(Signed) J. N. JORDAN,
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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.
TRELE
32382
CHINA TRADE.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[24123]
No. 1.
4 08
[July 13.]
SECTION 2.
Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 13.)
(No. 222. Confidential.) Sir,
Peking, May 23, 1908. WITH reference to my despatch No. 158 of the 2nd April, I have honour to report that negotiations have been proceeding for some weeks past between the Swedish Minister, M. Wallenberg, and his Excellency Lien-fang, a Minister of the Wai-wu Pu, for the conclusion of a new Treaty between Sweden and China.
M. Wallenberg informs me that prior to coming to China he had prepared a draft Treaty, composed of Articles extracted from the recent Treaties concluded with China, more especially the Japanese Treaty of 1895, from which he had drawn largely. This document he submitted to the Chinese negotiator, who, after studying it for some time, signified his intention of presenting a counter-draft. The latter was forthcoming in due course, and in producing it read a sort of preface or preamble in which atten- tion was drawn to the fact that the Swedish draft was based upon the Japanese Treaty of 1895, and it was explained that the concessions accorded to Japan by this instrument were the result of a successful war, and could not be extended to a Power of the standing occupied by Sweden.
M. Wallenberg took exception to this declaration, and after some discussion it was, I understand, withdrawn; but he has apparently been unable to induce the Chinese Government to accept his draft as a basis of negotiation.
Some days ago he consulted me with the view of ascertaining what prospect there was of his being able to enlist my own intervention and that of my colleagues, the Representatives of the other Powers, in bringing the Chinese to understand that they could not discriminate between the various foreign Powers, and that privileges enjoyed by one must be granted to all.
While agreeing with M. Wallenberg that smaller Powers should not be excluded from the benefits granted by Treaty to the larger ones, I said that I should not feel justified in intervening without express instructions from yourself, and that probably my colleagues would share the view that the initiative in such a question should proceed from their Governments rather than from themselves.
M. Wallenberg then asked my opinion as to the course which he should pursue, whether he should insist upon adhering to his own draft, or consent to enter into negotiations upon the basis of the Chinese draft, which contained many objectionable features.
Not having seen the latter, I could only say that my experience was that in dealing with Chinese there is little prospect of improving a situation if one starts on an unsatisfactory basis. Even if the alternative was, as M. Wallenberg expected, the abandonment of the question, it would probably be better to rest content with the old Treaty concluded with Sweden and Norway in 1847, with its most-favoured-nation clause, than to embark upon negotiations which gave little prospect of success, and which involved the sacrifice of essential principles.
I have, &c. (Signed)
J. N. JORDAN,
[1844 -2
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T
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